In this paper, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences respectively, namely ontological foundationalism and antiontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the paper will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases.
-How is social reality, in general, related to other aspects of reality? -Are there layers or levels of social reality -say micro-, meso-and macro-level -and, if so, how are they related?
In short, I subsume both investigations concerned with question of what there is ('furniture questions') in the social world and projects aiming at the nature and relations of the things there are under this label. I take it that this broad understanding of ontology is fairly uncontroversial within POSS (see Epstein 2015a). My aim in this paper, however, is not to answer any of those questions but to look at two opposed assessments of the relevance of these questions for the social sciences and to present an argument that may further a reorientation, i.e. a more fruitful way of engaging with questions like these in POSS. In the course of this, I will frequently refer to the individualism/holism disputes for illustrative purposes as they are central to many debates in social ontology (see Zahle and Collin 2014) .
Two Prominent Views
There are two prominent views on the relevance of doing ontology in contemporary POSS.
First, there are those who think that ontological investigations play a central role for the social sciences as they are the foundation for the explanation of social phenomena, social regularities and the effects that social phenomena have on individual behaviour. I call this view ontological foundationalism. Advocates of ontological foundationalism often argue that ontological issues in the social sciences have not received enough attention in the past and that, therefore, we need more serious thinking about social ontology to arrive at a solid foundation for the social sciences. The second camp thinks that ontological investigations are irrelevant or fruitless for explanations in the social sciences: I call this view anti-ontological pragmatism. Advocates of anti-ontological pragmatism typically argue that ontological issues in the social sciences have received too much attention in the past and that we need less (or no) thinking about social ontology in philosophy of the social sciences. Instead, philosophers of the social sciences should focus their efforts more exclusively on epistemological and methodological work.
Ontological Foundationalism: "Ontology first!"
Who endorses ontological foundationalism? Naturally, some philosophers in social ontology have argued explicitly for the importance of doing ontology for the social sciences. In a paper Searle is not very explicit about the exact relationship between ontology and methodology / the development of theoretical tools for the investigation of social reality here (or anywhere else).
In a closing passage in Making the Social World he even admits that he does not really know
what the implications of his theory for research in the social sciences are (Searle 2010, 200) . It seems to be clear, however, that Searle's general outlook is that the development of theories and explanatory tools in the social sciences somehow should depend on ontological foundations as "the whole investigation gets a greater depth if one is acutely conscious of the ontology of the phenomena being investigated" (ibid., 201).
Still, these statements by Searle are quite abstract. Looking at the individualism/holism debate in POSS, matters become more concrete. Consider Keith Sawyer´s writings in POSS. Sawyer (2002; 2003; 2005) aims at developing a position he calls 'non-reductive individualism', by analogy to one of the mainstream positions in philosophy of mind: non-reductive materialism.
He draws from well-known concepts in the philosophy of mind debate, above all supervenience 5 Objection: "Why Searle? Is he really a philosopher of the social sciences. Searle does not engage with the social scientific literature and he is barely cited in sociological discourse." I agree but I think he should be included nevertheless. For one, he is widely recognized as a an important participant in the ontological discourse in POSS (Guala 2007; Mantzavinos 2009 ). In addition, Searle (1995; 2010) explicitly aims, among other things, at improving the social sciences by providing a general picture of the ontological foundations of social reality.
and multiple realizability, to argue for a middle ground position in POSS between strong holism and individualism. This position is supposed "to provide a philosophical argument to ground collectivist macrosociology" (Sawyer 2002, 539 What is the motivation behind anti-ontological pragmatism? There seem to be a number of reasons for defending this position. Here, I will only discuss three of the most important ones:
First, some authors think the prioritisation of ontological investigations is slowing down or obstructing real progress in the philosophy of the social sciences. So, what about the first reason then; do we have to dismiss ontological investigations as they are undecidable and obstructing progress in POSS? Or is there a role to play for ontological investigations for the social sciences after all? The short answer is: it depends on the way of pursuing ontological questions.
Another Role for Ontology in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
No philosophical ontology of the social sphere determines theories and explanations in the social sciences (nor should it). I agree, and so do many if not most social scientists. Hardly anybody in the social sciences seems to be interested in ontological foundations as outlined and, at least to my knowledge, no social scientist has attempted to ground a new or better social science upon philosophical foundations. This is, of course, in part due to sociological factors such as separated disciplinary discourses and the sometimes uneasy relationship between philosophers and social scientists. I believe, however, that there is also a reasonable epistemic reason for this situation. In fact, ontological foundationalism appears to be a rather In suggesting that ontological investigations of the social sciences should extend beyond theories, I certainly do not mean to imply that theories are not important. They are an integral part of the social sciences, and theorizing as well as the application of theories is itself an epistemic activity (cf. Chang 2014: 67f). In other words, I take the practice turn not to be a turn away from theory but a turn towards the practical dimension of science, among other things.
Please note, that this understanding of ontological reasoning is compatible with my earlier characterization of ontological investigations, as all of the above-mentioned questions can be approached as questions about the ontological assumptions or commitments (broadly construed) of theories, explanatory frameworks and so on.
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There are a number of different roles that ontological investigations understood in this way could play for the social sciences. I will illustrate this with three examples.
( According to them the organizational ecologists' approach de facto lacks an evolutionary mechanism. The reason is that it specifies entities ("organizational populations") which are not capable of evolving in a Darwinian sense. In other words, the explanatory core of this Darwinian research approach seems to be flawed as the relevant entities cannot fulfil the intended explanatory role for ontological reasons.
In cases like this, ontological investigations in POSS have a normative function as they not only examine and clarify but also critically evaluate the ontological assumptions of social 7 In the end, my view may also be compatible with the more moderate passages of Van Bouwel's view: "[…] explanatory pluralism will still have to consider ontological issues in order to secure the compatibility and complementarity of theories and explanations" (2004, 534; see also Van Bouwel 2014, 164, Fn. 9 ) -however, he does not really say much about this aspect. In the following part of this paper I attempt to do just this.
explanations in light of their explanatory function. The idea then, is not to generally exclude explanatory frameworks for a priori ontological reasons (e.g. the hermeneutic nature of human action), as that would be ontological foundationalism all over again, but to provide a contextual critique of ontological assumptions given the postulated explanatory approach and the epistemic goals of the research enterprise. 8 This kind of ontological investigation is relevant for the social sciences as it is in close contact with explanatory practices and has the potential to advance the social sciences through accompanying critique.
(2) Some forms of social explanations rely heavily on unclear or taken-for-granted ontological assumptions that can (and should) be made clear / explicit by ontological investigations.
The social mechanism approach will be used to illustrate this point. (2000), however, is much more liberal in this respect in that it states that higher-level entities are an essential explanatory part of mechanistic explanations.
They are not just 'short-cuts' or 'context' but at the core of multilevel explanations. Why then is it the case that many social mechanists seem to think that the core of a social mechanism has to be spelled out in terms of interacting individuals whenever possible? Does this imply the existence of unreflected-upon foundationalist assumptions concerning social mechanisms?
Could these inhibit social research as certain kinds of (possibly) explanatory macromechanisms disappear form view due to taken-for-granted ontological assumptions (cf.
Kaidesoja 2013)?
One can, of course, choose not to think about these ontological issues, but the fact that one is not interested in the ontological aspects of the investigation does not mean that these aspects are not there; they just remain unexamined and in many cases unclear. Given the strong ontological flavour of mechanistic explanations, is seems inevitable to engage in these ontological issues -not as a foundation of mechanistic explanations, but as constructive and critical complement. Furthermore, the analysis of the ontological assumptions of (say) mechanistic explanations would make it possible to reveal the ways in which they guide research practices in the social sciences. 10 What kinds of phenomena or activity patterns are (not) likely to become visible with ontological framework F? What are the differences between different ontological frameworks in this respect?
In cases like these ((a) and (b) Luhmann's Systems Theory) really have deep or even incommensurable ontological differences or whether they just highlight different aspects of the social, as Tang (2011) would suggest. It may turn out to be the case that many concepts of the social -apparently carving social reality at different joints -are, in the end, compatible, as the perceived differences are only shallow.
To be sure, you can already find some framework comparisons in the social science literature, but, for the most part, these comparisons rely mainly on the (meta-)theoretical texts of the respective paradigms or school founders (see, e.g. López and Scott 2000). However, these 'grounding texts' tend to overemphasize differences between different concepts of the social and, therefore, a comparison based on these texts risks buying into these overstatements. For this reason, a philosopher of the social sciences interested in comparing different conceptions of the social should not only rely on the (meta-)theoretical texts. She should also look for potential case studies in which an explanation of a given social phenomenon or regularity is attempted within the explanatory framework F. In a second step, she would analyse the implicit ontological assumption made by F in this case and critically compare these with the explicitly stated assumptions to arrive at a somehow adjusted picture of the ontological assumptions of F. After having done this with different frameworks, she would have a better idea of the actual ontological assumptions of these frameworks and, therefore, would have a more reliable starting point for comparison between different paradigms.
In this case, ontological investigations in POSS primarily have a clarificatory and systematizing function. What are the actual ontological demands on the world of different paradigms? Do they really differ that much in explanatory practice or are the supposedly deep differences only apparent? What are core differences and similarities? Critical and impartial investigations of the actual ontological assumptions regarding 'the social' (conducted by philosophers of the social sciences) could provide a partial remedy to the fragmentation of the social sciences and help us to understand how many different ontological playing pieces there really are. It may even be possible to create a kind of meta-framework for different core conceptions of the social that would enable meaningful comparison and could foster inter-paradigmatic discourse and a fruitful kind of pluralism instead of talking at cross-purposes. This would not only be interesting from a philosophical point of view but -again -would be useful for social scientists as well.
There is even some concrete evidence that a project like this would be welcomed by social scientists. A group of prominent German sociologist recently published a working paper that made a similar case for the need of an impartial meta-framework for theory comparison and hinted at the possibility to base this framework on different core conceptions of 'the social' (Greshoff, Lindemann, and Schimank 2007) . This very much looks like a job to which philosophers of the social sciences could -and should -contribute.
Conclusion
In this paper, I attempted to show that ontological foundationalism as well as anti-ontological pragmatism are unsatisfactory: ontology is neither the foundation for the extension of social
